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Abstract
Following the devastating terrorist attacks of September 11,
2001,worldwide attention became focused on the Taliban and al-Qaida
forcesin Afghanistan. Prior to the attacks, many people had never heard
of the Taliban or their shar'ia-law style of government. Since 2001,
manysplinter groups have formed in response to the continual United
Statespresence in the region. Today, the term Taliban has been used to
envelop several groups such as the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), the
Haqqani Network (HQN) and the Tehrik-eNifaz-e-Shariat-e-
Mohammadi(TNSM). These groups make up the majority of fighters
along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border. Many of these groups have been
historicrivals for control of the region, but have since joined a loose
alliance in response to United States and Pakistani Government actions
in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). This article examines
the origins and operations of the Pakistani Taliban and associated
groups. Particular attention will be given as to how these groups receive
funding and support from each other through state sponsors such as
Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) agency and non-state sponsors
such as al-Qaida and Wahhabi idealists in Saudi Arabia, as well as arms
supplies from Iran and potentially China.
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The Tangled Web of Taliban and 
Associated Movements
By Greg Smith
Introduction
Following the devastating terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, 
worldwide attention became focused on the Taliban and al-Qaida forces 
in Afghanistan. Prior to the attacks, many people had never heard of the 
Taliban or their shar'ia-law style of government. Since 2001, many 
splinter groups have formed in response to the continual United States 
presence in the region. Today, the term Taliban has been used to envelop 
several groups such as the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), the Haqqani 
Network (HQN) and the Tehrik-eNifaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi 
(TNSM). These groups make up the majority of fighters along the 
Afghanistan-Pakistan border. Many of these groups have been historic 
rivals for control of the region, but have since joined a loose alliance in 
response to United States and Pakistani Government actions in the 
Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). This article examines the 
origins and operations of the Pakistani Taliban and associated groups. 
Particular attention will be given as to how these groups receive funding 
and support from each other through state sponsors such as Pakistan's 
Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) agency and non-state sponsors such as 
al-Qaida and Wahhabi idealists in Saudi Arabia, as well as arms supplies 
from Iran and potentially China.
Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)
In early September 2004, the Pakistani Government sent eighty thousand 
army and Frontier Corps (FC) forces into the FATA of South Waziristan. 
Militant members of the Mehsud tribe, aligned in ideology to the Taliban 
and residents of the FATA, repelled the attacks by conducting ambushes 
of army convoys. These tribal fighters had long objected to any interfer-
ence by the Pakistani forces in the region.1 The battle resulted in a stale-
mate, with the army capitulating control of the FATA to the tribal fighters. 
Around the same time, a prominent militant leader, Baitullah Mehsud, 
launched attacks on tribal leaders who favored negotiations with the Paki-
stani Government. Mehsud labeled his group the TTP. To ensure success, 
the TTP received ideological support from al-Qaida senior leadership, 
logistical support from the Afghanistan Taliban, intelligence support from 
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the ISI, and financial support from the madrassas and wealthy benefac-
tors in the Middle East.
The United States, recognizing the growing threat of the TTP, conducted a 
series of strikes from MQ-1B Predator aircraft in South Waziristan. In 
response to the Predator airstrikes and Pakistan's continued incursions 
into South Waziristan, Mehsud's TTP supported a spectacular suicide 
attack on the JW Marriott Hotel in Islamabad, Pakistan.2 This attack was 
sanctioned and applauded by al-Qaida and brought the TTP further under 
the Taliban umbrella.3 By all indications, al-Qaida continues to provide 
TTP with ideological support through its media outlets the Global Islamic 
Media Front (GIMF) and the Foundation for Islamic Media Publication 
(As-Sahab) by praising TTP leaders and encouraging further attacks on 
the Pakistani Government.4
South Waziristan's western border leads directly into Afghanistan's 
Paktika province. Paktika has been a stronghold of the Afghanistan 
Taliban and has often been the site of attacks on coalition forces. The 
Taliban view Paktika as a strategic center of gravity as it leads to Kabul 
and the Tora Bora mountains. The TTP allow Afghan Taliban forces to use 
bases in South Waziristan to launch these attacks and share logistics with 
the parent movement.5 This cooperation between groups allows both to 
flourish in terms of supply and maneuver.
Mehsud and the TTP appeared to operate with impunity in the South 
Waziristan agency. This freedom of maneuver came in the face of contin-
ued Pakistani military incursions into the region. Reports have indicated 
that the ISI provided support to Mehsud in the form of advance warning 
of impending military actions in Waziristan.6 Mehsud was finally killed by 
a United States Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) in August 2009. The 
power vacuum has created some instability in the TTP, but the core fac-
tion is largely intact and under the leadership of Hakimullah Mehsud, a 
top commander in Orakzai province and cousin to the slain Baitullah.
Funding
The TTP receives substantial funding from three primary areas. First, the 
local madrassas have provided Mehsud with funding for his insurgency. 
Madrassas receive funding from prominent Muslims in Saudi Arabia and 
the Gulf states, which is then often funneled through the madrassa system 
into the hands of the TTP. Second, the TTP is indirectly funded from 
wealthy benefactors who share a common ideology of shar'ia law and sub-
scribe to the Wahhabi sect of Islam. This radical view of Islam originated 
in Saudi Arabia and has spread throughout Pakistan in response to the 
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continued presence of U.S. forces in the region. Finally, The TTP partici-
pates in opium smuggling and heroin production in South Waziristan. 
Funding from this smuggling accounts for the vast majority of TTP 
financing.7 
The Haqqani Network (HQN)
Jallaluddin Haqqani is the tribal leader in North Waziristan and has been 
associated with the Taliban for almost fourteen years. Haqqani serves as 
Amir for the HQN. The HQN conducts attacks inside Afghanistan's 
Paktika province from his Waziristan base. In 2008, this group was 
responsible for the majority of suicide attacks in Kabul, Afghanistan.8 
Like the TTP, Haqqani and his network receive support from al-Qaida, 
other Taliban-associated movements, and passive support from the 
Pakistani Government and the ISI.
The HQN cooperates with Mehsud's TTP in terms of logistical support 
and tribal influence. While both groups originate from the same Zadran 
tribe, sub-tribe conflicts and competition for power kept the movements 
separated until the United States began operations in the region in late 
2001. Predator strikes in the North Waziristan city of Miram Shah 
attempted to kill Haqqani but failed.9 These actions emboldened Haqqani 
and served to drive his group further under the influence of the overall 
Taliban movement. In addition, both HQN and TTP share access to 
opium smuggling routes allowing the drugs to move in and out of 
Afghanistan with relative ease. These actions are also a source of 
considerable funding for the group and allow future operations.
Haqqani has an established personal relationship with Usama bin Ladin 
and Ayman al-Zawahiri and was once the commander of all Taliban forces 
in Afghanistan when they battled the Northern Alliance in the late 1990s. 
Haqqani receives significant ideological and media support from al-
Qaida's media network. Videos of HQN suicide bombers are broadcast on 
the GIMF websites to inspire other radical elements to action. Many of al-
Qaida's messages include HQN as a member of their organization. While 
this is not entirely true, Haqqani capitalizes on this relationship in order 
to raise funds from benefactors sympathetic to al-Qaida's cause. The 
Waziristan Accord between the Pakistani Government and tribal elders in 
Waziristan, brokered by Haqqani, has allowed the HQN to grow in 
strength and influence.
Following the peace deal in Waziristan, Pakistan itself became an unwill-
ing state sponsor of terror by allowing the group to operate unrestricted in 
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exchange for no attacks in Pakistan. Pakistan lacks the resources in the 
FATA to mitigate the HQN influence and is in fact trapped by the previous 
policies of self-government and a minimal footprint. All of these factors 
favor the HQN and allow them to wield enormous influence amongst the 
tribes in Waziristan.
During the 1980s, Haqqani was a favorite of the CIA and ISI in terms of 
funneling arms and mujahideen to fight the Soviets. As the Cold War 
ended, the CIA lost interest in Haqqani and quickly moved to other 
projects in Africa and the Middle East. The twelve-year absence of CIA 
presence was supplemented by Pakistan's ISI. Haqqani and the ISI shared 
significant intelligence as the Taliban marched across Afghanistan. This 
relationship, although strained by the events of September 11, has not 
completely dissolved. The ISI still provides the HQN with intelligence 
assistance in hopes of preserving the relationship post-U.S. withdrawal 
from the region. Many hard-line Islamists within the ISI continue to use 
the HQN and other associated movements as a proxy force for its greater 
ambitions in the region. Haqqani is happy to oblige this relationship but 
remains independent in actions against the United States forces in 
Afghanistan.
Finally, Haqqani receives considerable funding from wealthy Saudis and 
Gulf state Islamists. As one of the few movements that include a large 
number of foreign fighters, Haqqani has cultivated a strong relationship 
that ensures future funding. Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states view 
Haqqani as an asset while downplaying any relationship to the United 
States. Radical Islamists see both the HQN and the TTP as models for 
future Islamic armies.
Tehrik-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi (TNSM)
The militant group capturing most of the headlines in Pakistan today is 
Tehrik-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi (TNSM). Founded in 1992 by 
Maulana Sufi Mohammad in response to the United States' presence in 
Pakistan, the TNSM has attempted to implement shar'ia law in Pakistan's 
Northwest Frontier Provinces (NWFP).10 The TNSM rose to prominence 
in 2001 when Sufi Mohammad rallied thousands of Pakistani tribesmen 
to fight the Northern Alliance. This campaign was closely monitored and 
supported by Pakistan's ISI.
As the United States war in Afghanistan began, the Pakistani Government 
closed the border but turned a blind eye to any militants wanting to fight 
for the Taliban.11 These militants returned to Pakistan and began a cam-
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paign of militancy in the Pakistani agencies of Bajaur and Malakand. The 
Pakistanis responded by capturing Sufi Mohammad and trying him for 
subversion. With Sufi Mohammad in a Pakistan prison, control of the 
TNSM fell to his son-in-law, Maulana Fazlullah. Fazlullah wasted no time 
in aligning his fighters under the Taliban umbrella.
The TNSM has waged a bloody offensive in the NWFP with actions in the 
Swat District and has exerted considerable influence in the agencies of 
Dir, Malakand, and Bajaur. The TNSM receives support in several areas. 
First, internal financial support for the group comes from radical 
mosques and madrassas. Funds from these entities allow the group to 
continue its struggle against the Pakistani Government. Second, TNSM 
fighters have taken control of the emerald mines in Swat Valley. The 
group retains about a third of the profits earned from these mines. This is 
significant considering that these emerald mines have historically yielded 
approximately 10 percent of the world's uncut gems, worth about US$15 
million.12 Finally, the TNSM profits from smuggling activity in the border 
agencies of Bajaur and Dir. Opium smuggled through these routes heads 
either through Central Asia and on to Europe or across Kashmir toward 
Asia. Just as the HQN and TTP benefit from Saudi and Gulf State support, 
so too does the TNSM. This financial support is normally routed through 
charitable organizations and then filtered to the group for use.
Conclusion: Commonalities between the Three 
Groups
Although the three militant groups discussed are located in different 
areas and are from different tribes, they share four common beliefs that 
have led to a unified front for the time being. First, the groups all share a 
radical interpretation of Islam. This view aligns with the Taliban's goal of 
a strict implementation of shar'ia law. Second, all three groups 
vehemently oppose the presence of the United States in Afghanistan. As 
the Taliban and al-Qaida continue to call for Muslims to oppose the 
occupation, the groups are able to set aside tribal and cultural differences 
to unite against an outside force. Third, the groups oppose the Pakistani 
Government in terms of democratic reforms and an attempt to impose 
any form of rule in the NWFP and FATA; the actions of the Pakistani 
army, at the urging of the United States, have actually made the situation 
worse for the government. Finally, all of the groups are profiting from the 
conflict in terms of finances and power. Hakimullah Mehsud, Haqqani, 
and Fazlullah have emerged as the leaders of their respective groups and 
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have benefited from continued actions. They will continue to support each 
other and the Taliban as long as it continues to prove profitable in terms 
of ideology, power, and funds.
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